An Approach to Generate the Traceability Between Restricted Natural Language Requirements and AADL Models by Wang, Fei et al.
HAL Id: hal-02382714
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02382714
Submitted on 27 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
An Approach to Generate the Traceability Between
Restricted Natural Language Requirements and AADL
Models
Fei Wang, Zhibin Yang, Zhi-Qiu Huang, Cheng-Wei Liu, Yong Zhou,
Jean-Paul Bodeveix, Mamoun Filali
To cite this version:
Fei Wang, Zhibin Yang, Zhi-Qiu Huang, Cheng-Wei Liu, Yong Zhou, et al.. An Approach to Gener-
ate the Traceability Between Restricted Natural Language Requirements and AADL Models. IEEE
Transactions on Reliability, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2019, 1 (1), pp.1-20.
￿10.1109/TR.2019.2936072￿. ￿hal-02382714￿
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent 
to the repository administrator: tech-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr 
This is an author’s version published in: 
http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/25027 
To cite this version: Wang, Fei and Yang, Zhibin and Huang, Zhi-Qiu 
and Liu, Cheng-Wei and Zhou, Yong and Bodeveix, Jean-Paul and Filali, 
Mamoun An Approach to Generate the Traceability Between Restricted 
Natural Language Requirements and AADL Models. (2019) IEEE 
Transactions on Reliability, 1 (1). 1-20. ISSN 0018-9529 
Official URL 
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1109/TR.2019.2936072 
Open  Archive  Toulouse  Archive  Ouverte 
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse 
researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible 
1An Approach to Generate the Traceability Between
Restricted Natural Language Requirements
and AADL Models
Fei Wang , Zhi-Bin Yang , Zhi-Qiu Huang , Cheng-Wei Liu, Yong Zhou, Jean-Paul Bodeveix,
and Mamoun Filali
Abstract—Requirements traceability is broadly recognized as a 
critical element of any rigorous software development process, es-
pecially for building safety-critical software (SCS) systems. Model-
driven development (MDD) is increasingly used to develop SCS in 
many domains, such as automotive and aerospace. MDD provides 
new opportunities for establishing traceability links through mod-
eling and model transformations. Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language (AADL) is a standardized architecture description lan-
guage for embedded systems, which is widely used in avionics and 
aerospace industries to model safety-critical applications. However, 
there is a big challenge to automatically establish the traceability 
links between requirements and AADL models in the context of 
MDD, because requirements are mostly written as free natural 
language texts, which are often ambiguous and difficult to be pro-
cessed automatically. To bridge the gap between natural language 
requirements (NLRs) and AADL models, we propose an approach 
to generate the traceability links between NLRs and AADL models. 
First, we propose a requirement modeling method based on the 
restricted natural language, which is named as RM-RNL. The 
RM-RNL can eliminate the ambiguity of NLRs and barely change 
engineers’ habits of requirement specification. Second, we present a 
method to automatically generate the initial AADL models from the 
RM-RNLs and to automatically establish traceability links between 
the elements of the RM-RNL and the generated AADL models. 
Third, we refine the initial AADL models through patterns to 
achieve the change of requirements and traceability links. Finally, 
we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach with industrial 
case studies and evaluation experiments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
SOFTWARE has been widely used in safety-critical systems,and it is increasing in size and complexity. Software safety
has become critical to the development of such systems, since
the consequence of a failure in such software may be serious
[1]. Therefore, developing safety-critical software (SCS) im-
poses special demands for ensuring the quality of the developed
software.
Requirement traceability is defined as “the ability to follow the
life of a requirement in both a backward and forward direction”
[2], and it is a critical element of any rigorous software devel-
opment process [3], especially for building SCS systems. For
example, the Federal Aviation Administration has established
DO-178C [4] as the accepted means for certifying all new
aviation software, and this standard specifies that at each stage of
development software, developers must be able to demonstrate
traceability of designs against requirements. Similarly, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration states that traceability analysis
must be used to verify that a software design implements all of
its specified software requirements, that all aspects of the design
are traceable to software requirements, and that all code is linked
to established specifications and established test procedures [5].
Model-driven development (MDD) is increasingly used to de-
velop SCS in many domains, such as automotive and aerospace
[6]. To improve the quality and control development costs of
systems, MDD advocates the use of formally defined models
as first-class citizens during software development instead of
using models just as informal mediums for describing software
systems or to facilitate interteam communication [7]. Existing
MDD languages and approaches have covered various modeling
demands, such as Unified Modeling Language (UML) [8] for
general modeling, SysML [9] for system modeling, Simulink
[10] for control system modeling, and Architecture Analysis and
Design Language (AADL) [11] for the architectural modeling
of embedded systems.
AADL is an architecture description language standardized
by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in 2004 and
published as SAE 5506 standard. It is a de facto standard in the
domain of avionics and automotive software systems. AADL is 
specifically designed for the specification, analysis, code genera-
tion, and automated integration of real-time critical systems (real 
time, embedded, fault tolerant, secure, safety critical, software 
intensive, and so on) [12]. Moreover, it provides a vehicle to 
allow analysis of system (and system of systems) designs prior to 
development and supports a model-based development approach 
throughout the system life cycle [13].
MDD also provides new opportunities for establishing trace-
ability links through modeling and model transformations [14]. 
With the support of MDD strategies, transformation-based tech-
niques can generate traceability links along with the generation 
of artifacts (e.g., design models), which may be represented in 
different languages and at different levels of abstractions [15].
However, it is difficult to establish the traceability links 
between requirements and design models in the context of 
MDD. There is a substantial inherent gap between requirement 
descriptions and designs, because the transformation from re-
quirements to design models is not included in the model-driven 
architecture life cycle, which starts from an analysis model (or 
design model) and ends with deployed code [15]. The reason of 
this exclusion is perhaps that requirements are always written 
with free natural language texts, which are not a model formal 
enough to be understood by computers. As a result, free natural 
language requirements (NLRs) are not suitable for automated 
transformations.
Therefore, we leverage MDD techniques into the automatic 
generation of traceability links between NLRs and AADL 
models.
A. Research Questions
Traceability links provide a critical support for numerous
software engineering activities, including safety analysis, com-
pliance verification, and impact prediction [16]. Therefore,
traceability is a critical element of almost all SCS develop-
ment processes. Although the traceability concept seems very
promising to be a significant value gain in a project, it is still
not very widely spread in the development practice except for
projects under certain circumstances. Despite the needed efforts,
the perceived benefits for developers are often low because the
quality of captured traceability information is often low or its
validity and correctness is hard to ensure [17].
In this article, we apply MDD techniques into automatic gen-
eration of traceability links between NLRs and AADL models.
In order to achieve this goal, we derive the following research
questions.
1) RQ-1: How to precisely describe the requirements of
SCS and barely change engineers’ habits of requirement
specification?
2) RQ-2: How to automatically establish traceability links
between NLRs and AADL models?
3) RQ-3: How to maintain the traceability links when the
requirements change or AADL models are refined?
B. Contribution
Our overall objective is to devise a methodology and its tool
to automatically establish traceability links between NLRs and
design models. The contributions of this article are given as
follows.
1) We propose a requirements modeling method based on re-
stricted natural language (RM-RNL), which was extended
from [18]. The RM-RNL can eliminate the ambiguity of
NLRs and barely change engineers’ habits of requirement
specification.
2) In the context of MDD, we propose a method to au-
tomatically generate the initial AADL models from the
RM-RNLs and to automatically establish traceability links
between the elements of the RM-RNL and the generated
AADL models.
3) We refine the initial AADL models through patterns to
achieve the change of requirements and traceability links.
4) We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach with
industrial case studies and evaluation experiments.
C. Organization
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section II
presents the background of this article. In Section III, we
describe the traceability scenarios and present the formal de-
scription of traceability links in each traceability scenario. In
Section IV, we introduce the RM-RNL briefly and then describe
the automatic generation method of requirement traceability
links based on model transformations. The maintenance of
requirement traceability during the AADL refinement process is
described in Section V. In Section VI, we illustrate the validation
of the approach with two industry case studies. In Section
VII, we evaluate our approach and discuss potential threats
to the validity of the discovered results. In Section VIII, we
discuss the work related to our study. Section IX concludes this
article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. MACAerospace Project
MACAerospace is a research project about modeling, analy-
sis, and code generation for aerospace software in China. The
aim of the MACAerospace project is to reduce the barriers of
entering model-based systems engineering (MBSE) for engi-
neers and implement an MBSE tool that fits the actual demand
of Chinese industries.
AADL is a de facto standard in the domain of avionics and
automotive software systems. It is a unifying framework for
model-based software systems engineering to capture the static
modular software architecture, the runtime architecture in terms
of communicating tasks, the computer platform architecture on
which the software is deployed, and any physical system or
environment with which the system interacts [11]. Thus, AADL
provides a rigorous and extensible foundation for the application
of MDD for embedded systems to allow analysis of system
(and system of systems) designs prior to development and sup-
ports an MDD approach throughout the life cycle of embedded
systems [19].
Moreover, AADL allows introducing both property sets and
annex sublanguages as extensions. The first is to extend property
sets for information, which cannot be described by predefined
Fig. 1. Global view of the MACAerospace project.
property sets. The second is to extend AADL annex, which is
a sublanguage concerning on specific aspects, and their own
semantics should be consistent to AADL core semantics. Ex-
isting AADL annexes include Data-Model annex [20], which
describes the modeling of specific data constraint with AADL,
Error Model Annex V2 [21], which specifies fault and propaga-
tion concerns, ARINC653 Annex [22], which defines modeling
patterns for modeling avionics system, and Behavior Annex
(BA) [23], which describes component behaviors with state
machines, and so on.
The global view of the MACAerospace project is given in
Fig. 1. MACAerospace is an integrated toolset for modeling,
analysis, verification, and code generation based on AADL. Its
functions are presented as follows:
1) a requirement modeling method based on restricted Chi-
nese natural language for Aerospace Software. This re-
quirement modeling method can be extended to other
safety-critical domains, such as railway and automotive;
2) automatically generate the AADL models from the
RM-RNL through model transformations;
3) refinement of the initial AADL models with graphi-
cal BA/hierarchical BA [24] and graphical synchronous
language SIGNAL [25];
4) provide an integrated verification environment for AADL
models using existing verification and analysis tools, such
as Timed Abstract State Machine (TASM) [26], UPPAAL
[27], and so on. MACAerospace can perform composi-
tional verification based on AGREE [28] at system level.
The verification results are feedback to the AADL models;
5) automatically generate C/Ada code from the AADL
models;
6) verify the semantic consistency between AADL models
and C/Ada code;
7) reverse engineering from C/Ada code to AADL models;
8) traceability and documents generation.
Fig. 2. Dimensions and directions of traceability links.
This article mainly focuses on the traceability between NLRs
and AADL models. Concretely speaking, as shown in the red
part of Fig. 1, the main research contents of this article in-
clude automatically generating the requirement traceability links
based on model transformations and maintaining traceability
links when the requirements change or AADL models are
refined.
B. Requirement Traceability
In requirement engineering domain, the term traceability is
usually used for the ability to follow the traces to and from re-
quirements. One common definition of requirement traceability
is given by Pinheiro [29] as “the ability to define, capture, and
follow the traces left by requirements on other elements of the
software development environment and the traces left by those
elements on requirements.” Another definition of requirement
traceability is offered by Gotel and Finkelstein [2] as “the ability
to describe and follow the life of a requirement, in both forward
and backward directions (i.e., from its origins, through its de-
velopment and specification, to its subsequent deployment and
use, and through periods of on-going refinement and iteration in
any of these phases).”
Usually, these definitions are also implicitly (e.g., in [30]) or
explicitly [31] extended to general traceability of all artifacts
as the ability to define, describe, capture, and follow traces
from and to artifacts throughout the whole software development
process, which seems sensible because all artifacts of a software
development are (or at least should be) driven by requirements.
Tracing can be considered for various purposes and so is per-
formed based on different foundations, such as based on logical
interrelations among artifacts or based on temporal dependence
between artifacts. The most common types of traceability, in the
requirement traceability literature, are forward and backward
traceability, horizontal and vertical traceability, and prerequire-
ment specification (pre-RS) and postrequirement specification
(post-RS) traceability [32], which are illustrated in Fig. 2.
1) Forward Traceability and Backward Traceability [33]: 
Forward traceability refers to following the traceability links 
to the artifacts that have been derived from the artifact under 
consideration. Backward traceability refers to the ability to 
follow the traceability links from a specific artifact back to 
its sources from which it has been derived. The forward and 
backward directions pertain to the logical flow of the software 
and system development process. These are the fundamental and 
primitive types of tracing.
2) Horizontal Traceability and Vertical Traceability [34]: 
These terms differentiate between traceability links of artifacts 
belonging to the same project phase or level of abstraction, 
and links between artifacts belonging to different ones. Hori-
zontal traceability is about tracing artifacts at the same level 
of abstraction. Vertical traceability is used to trace artefacts at 
different levels of abstraction to accommodate lifecycle-wide 
or end-to-end traceability. These two types can employ both 
forward and backward traceability.
3) Pre-RS Traceability and Post-RS Traceability [2]: This 
two types of traceability are more conceptual in nature, and 
these can employ each of the above tracing types in some 
combinations. Pre-RS traceability comprises all those traces that 
show the derivation of the requirements from their sources and, 
hence, explicates the requirements production process. Post-RS 
traceability comprises those traces derived from or grounded in 
the requirements and, hence, explicates the requirements deploy-
ment process. This two types of traceability may employ forward 
traceability, backward traceability, horizontal traceability, and 
vertical traceability.
III. TRACEABILITY SCENARIOS
In this section, we derive a description model from the 
existing body of knowledge on requirement traceability that 
characterizes major traceability scenarios in this article. Differ-
ent intended traceability usage scenarios may require different 
artifacts to be related [35]. For example, the demonstration of 
regulatory compliance requires traceability between regulatory 
codes and requirements, while, in contrast, the demonstration 
of implementation completeness requires traceability between 
requirements and source code. In this article, we focus on three 
traceability scenarios in the development process of software:
1) TS-1: implementing a new requirement.
2) TS-2: implementing a requirement change.
3) TS-3: implementing a refined artifact of design model.
The first traceability scenario (TS-1) is based on the RM-
RNL, which automatically generates the AADL models and
requirement traceability links through model transformations.
TS-2 describes the requirement changes, that is, change the
elements of the RM-RNL; we should regenerate the AADL
models and the traceability links. Therefore, the implementation
of TS-1 and TS-2 is the same in our approach. TS-3 describes the
refinement of the AADL models; we should maintain the change
of the requirements and the traceability links at the same time.
Therefore, we propose the concept of “refinement patterns” to
refine the initial AADL models and achieve the change of the
requirements and the traceability links.
Generally, the software development life cycle mainly in-
cludes three kinds of artifacts: requirement specification, design
model, and source code. We denote R as a set of requirement
specifications that explicitly describe the function and nonfunc-
tion constraints that should be implemented in the software
system, D as a set of the artifacts in the design model that contain
explicit instructions on how to build a software system in order
to satisfy R, and S as a set of source codes that implement D
in order to build the software system. In addition, the software
development life cycle spans two different stages: the initial
development stage and the evolution and refinement stage [36].
We denote CR as a set of requirement change specifications that
describe how a software system is supposed to be changed to
meet newly emerged, shifted, or misunderstood customers’ ex-
pectations. Similarly, we denote CD as a set of design evolution
and refinement and CS as a set of changed source code.
The usage of traceability refers to the activity of following
traceability links from a source artifact to a target artifact [37] to
achieve an explicit goal in a development project. The usage of
traceability has two main benefits: it is essential to change impact
analysis, and it helps to determine completion. Thereby, impact
analysis refers to identifying the consequences of implementing
a new or a changed requirement [38]. Completion analysis refers
to resolving either the traceability from requirements to their
implementation or vice versa and allows determining whether
or not all the specifications and the implementation are com-
plete [39]. While project managers and requirement engineers
concern with the change impact on and the completeness of
requirements artifacts, system engineers and developers concern
with the change impact on and the completeness of source code
artifacts.
In summary, analyzing change impact and determining com-
pleteness are the most common traceability use cases in practice.
Therefore, in order to standardize the process of establishing
traceability links (path), we give the standard form of require-
ment traceability links (path) in three traceability scenarios
based on the requirement traceability description model shown
in Fig. 3.
In the following subsections, we discuss these three trace-
ability scenarios and refer especially to three characteristics: the
source artifacts on which the analysis is applied, the traceability
link paths that are followed to conduct the analysis, and the
target artifacts to which traceability link paths are resolved. Ad-
ditionally, we provide illustrating examples for each discussed
scenario.
A. Implementing a New Requirement or Requirement Change
First, we consider the horizontal traceability in the require-
ments phase. In this phase, we concern with the analysis of
effects that a new or a changed requirement has on its dependent
requirements artifacts. Horizontal traceability relations from
a new or changed requirement to dependent requirements or
requirement changes are to be resolved by the stakeholders
in order to identify what other requirements are potentially
impacted. Thus, the source artifact is an element of R or CR; the
target artifacts are dependent requirement artifacts, which are
Fig. 3. Requirement traceability description model.
potentially impacted by the new or changed requirement. The
traceability link paths between source and target artifacts consist
of horizontal traceability links across requirement artifacts only.
Thus, traceability paths can consist of any of the following trace-
ability links in any sequence: r → r, r → cr, cr → cr, cr → r,
where r ∈ R and cr ∈ CR.
Next, we consider the vertical traceability in the process of
requirements implementing. In this phase, we must create a set
of new design and source code artifacts to implement the new
requirements, and also, we can establish a traceability link path
between requirements and source code. We also concern with
completeness determination for new or changed requirements.
The vertical traceability is resolved by the engineers to follow
the implementation process subsequently from its originating
requirement to its final result (source code) in order to identify
whether or not all stated requirements are satisfied by source
code. Thus, the source artifact is an element of R or CR, and
the target artifacts are elements of S. The traceability link paths
between source and target artifacts consist of vertical traceability
links only. Each traceability link path connects a requirement
with a source code artifact through zero to many intermediate
design artifacts: r[→ d]∗ → s or cr[→ d]∗ → s, where r ∈ R,
d ∈ D, s ∈ S and cr ∈ CR.
Examples: The example of implementing a new requirement
is shown in Fig. 4(a). In this example, the set of source artifacts
consists of the newly created requirement r2 and the set of target
artifacts consists of r1, which is the only dependent requirement
of r2. The artifacts r2 and r1 are connected through the trace-
ability link path: r2 → r1. In addition, we create design artifact
d2 and code artifact s2 and s3 to fulfill the new requirement r2.
While r2 and s3 are connected through the traceability link path:
r2 → d2 → s2, the artifacts r2 and s3 are connected through the
traceability link path: r2 → d2 → s3. Similarly, the example of
implementing a requirement change is shown in Fig. 4(b); we
Fig. 4. Overview of the traceability links for each implementation scenario.
(a) Implementation of new requirements. (b) Implementation of changed
requirements. (c) Implementation of design refinement.
can create horizontal traceability link path: cr1 → r2 → r1, and
vertical traceability link path: cr1 → d3 → s4.
B. Implementing a Refined Artifact in Design Models
First, we consider the horizontal traceability of refined ar-
tifacts in the design model. In this phase, we concern with
the analysis of effects that a refined design artifact has on its
dependent design artifacts. Thus, the source artifact is an element
of CD; the target artifacts are dependent design model artifacts,
which are potentially impacted by the refined design artifacts.
The traceability link paths between source and target artifacts
consist of horizontal traceability links across design artifacts
only. Thus, traceability link paths can consist of any of the
following traceability links in any sequence: cd→ d, cd → cd,
where d ∈ D and cd ∈ CD.
Next, we consider the vertical traceability in the process
of implementation. In this phase, we must change or create
a set of requirement and source code artifacts to satisfy the
refined artifacts in design model, and also, we must maintain the
traceability link path from design to requirements and design
to source code. In addition, we also concern with complete-
ness determination for the refined design models. Therefore,
the vertical traceability can be trace to requirement through
backward traceability, and trace to source code through forward
traceability. Thus, the source artifact is an element of CD, and the
target artifacts are elements of CR or CS. Each traceability link
path connects a design artifact with a requirement or source code
artifact: cd[→ d]∗[→ r]∗ → cr, where r ∈ R, d ∈ D, cr ∈ CR
and cd ∈ CD.
Examples: The example of implementing a refined artifact in
design models is shown in Fig. 4(c); the set of source artifacts
consists of the refined design model artifacts cd1 and the set of
target artifacts consists of the changed requirement cr1. While
cd1 and cr1 are connected through the traceability link path:
cd1 → d1 → r1 → cr1 .
IV. AUTOMATICALLY GENERATE THE REQUIREMENT
TRACEABILITY LINKS
In this section, we first introduce the RM-RNL; then, we
describe the method of transformation from the RM-RNL to
the AADL models. Finally, we present the traceability between
the RM-RNL and the AADL models.
A. RM-RNL
To promote the application of MDD in safety-critical do-
mains and bridge the gap between NLRs and AADL mod-
els, we proposed a requirements description method based on
the restricted NLRs template in [18]. However, this require-
ment template mainly describes the hierarchical structure of
the requirements and the interface and interaction between the
modules, and it lacks of the description ability for functional
behaviors.
Specifically, the RM-RNL provides a method to structure re-
quirements and restricts the way how users specify requirements.
RM-RNL is a 4-tuples, i.e., RM-RNL ::=< Glossary,Data_
Dictionary,Requirement_Template_Set,Restricted_
Rules >.
1) Glossary: A Glossary describes the domain and system
specified terminologies in requirement specifications, includ-
ing the names of systems, modes, hardware, states, etc. Each
terminology in Glossary can be defined as a 3-tuple, i.e.,
Terminology ::=< Id,Name, Type >.
2) Data_Dictionary: A Data_Dictionary describes all the
data and event elements in requirement specifications, including
static data (constants or parameters), dynamic data (interactive
data), etc. Data has simple or complex types (like struct in C).
Each data in Data_Dictionary can be defined as a 7-tuple, i.e.,
Data ::=< Id,DataName,DataType,DataUnit,Data
Range,Data−Accuracy,DataDescription >.
3) Requirement_Template_Set: It is a common practice in
industry to decompose requirements with hierarchical structure,
which is same as AADL models. Thus, requirement specifica-
tions in RM-RNL are organized as four levels: System (SRT),
sub-System (SSRT), Function (FRT), and sub-Function (SFRT),
for each level we define a template. A higher level requirement
template can take lower level ones as its children, and these
hierarchical relations build up the structure of requirements.
We also define a shared function block requirement template
(SFBRT), which describes common functions used in different
function blocks.
Specifically, a requirement template usually consists of an
identifer (ID), name, input, output, template composition, and
requirement constraint. ID represents the unique identifier of
the template. Name represents the name of the template that is
defined in Glossary. Input and output describe the interaction
between the current module and others, and generally include
two types of event and data. Template composition describes
that a complex system can be decomposed into several sub-
systems and functions, and a subsystem can be further decom-
posed into several subsystems and functions, and a function
can be decomposed into several subfunctions. Requirement
constraint includes mode transition, functional requirement,
hardware constraint, interface requirement, and performance
requirement.
1) Mode transition describes modes and mode transitions of
the module (Not in SFRT and SFBRT).
TABLE I
GENERAL RESTRICTION RULES OF SENTENCE
2) Functional requirements represent the dynamic behav-
ior of the module. For a critical functional requirement,
we can mark it as safety-critical function. According to
the ICE61508 standard, the safety requirements can be
divided into safety functional requirements and safety-
related constraints. Therefore, a safety requirement can
be expressed by one or more safety-critical functions and
safety-related constraints.
3) Hardware constraints represent the hardware requirements
of the software systems, such as CPU, memory, etc.
4) Interface requirements represent the requirements of the
interface between each module and the environment, such
as interface data transfer protocol.
5) Performance requirements represent the quantitative re-
quirements for the ability of software to complete
tasks, such as real time, power consumption, maximum
processing capacity, etc.
4) Restricted_Rules: For each element in the template of the
RM-RNL, we design a set of general restriction rules shown
in Table I.
In addition, we define a set of sentence patterns. Each sentence
pattern represents a complex sentence structure, which are com-
posed of sequences of single sentences conjunct by the keywords
(e.g., IF THEN ELSE, AND, LOOP FOR, NOT) for describing
different requirements. We have designed several recommended
simple sentence patterns for each kind of requirement in the
template of the RM-RNL. Here, we give five predefined sentence
patterns for functional requirements and example, as shown
in Table II.
There are three types of simple sentence in Table II, where
Behavior denotes a simple sentence describing a single behavior
action, such as “this module sends Handshake Information to
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Computer (GNCC).” Con-
dition denotes the conditions (single conditions conjuncted by
AND) of actions, including dispatch conditions and variable
conditions such as “IF receiving Handshake Success Informa-
tion.” TimeRestrain denotes time constraint such as “function A
finishes in 5 s.”
Here, we give a running example of RM-RNL, i.e., the
“GNCC Controlling Data Retransmission” module in the GNCC
system, which is shown in Table III. GNCC Controlling Data
Retransmission in Intelligent Terminal Unit is a small unit in
TABLE II
SENTENCE PATTERNS FOR FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
“+” means sequences of elements explained below in sentences, e.g., “Condition + Behavior” presenting a sentence pattern as “IF Condition, Then Behavior.”
TABLE III
MODULE OF GNCC CONTROLLING DATA RETRANSMISSION SPECIFIED BY
THE RM-RNL
the data management system in GNCC, and it is in charge
of data retransmission for GNCC. Input and output such as
“GNCC Controlling Data” in Table III have been defined in
the data dictionary. “GNCC” and “GNCC Controlling Data
Retransmission” have been defined in the glossary. Sentences
1–4 in Functional Requirement satisfy sentence patterns SP3,
SP4 with keyword “LOOP FOR,” SP2 with keyword “AND,”
and SP1, respectively.
B. Automatically Generate the Requirement Traceability Links
Through Model Transformations
Restricted_Rules are mainly used to restrict the expressive-
ness of natural language to reduce ambiguity and vagueness. The
Glossary is transformed to the AADL models straightly. There-
fore, we just consider the transformation of Data_Dictionary and
Requirement_Template_Set to AADL models.
1) Transformation of Data_Dictionary: Data in data dictio-
nary are directly transformed to AADL data components.
The items of a data are transformed into subcomponents
and properties of an AADL data component.
Fig. 5. Metamodel of the RM-RNL.
2) Transformation of Requirements Templates: To simplify
the transformation and facilitate the possibilities for
further extensions, we propose an intermediate model,
which is named as RAInterM (RM-RNL2AADL Inter-
mediate Model).
In the following sections, we present the transformations in
details. We first introduce the metamodel of RM-RNL and RAIn-
terM, and then describe the transformations from RM-RNL to
RAInterM and the transformations from RAInterM to AADL
respectively. Finally, we discuss the traceability between the
RM-RNL and the AADL models.
1) Metamodel of the RM-RNL: The requirement specifica-
tions with the RM-RNL essentially contains three parts: glos-
sary and data dictionary, requirement templates, and sentence
patterns. Thus, we define the metamodel of the RM-RNL, which
is shown in Fig. 5.
1) Data Dictionary and Glossary: Each data item refers to
an instance of DataWord and each terminology refers to
an instance of Term in the metamodel.
2) Templates: Are organized as requirement templates for
systems, subsystems, functions, subfunctions, and shared
Fig. 6. Metamodel of RAInterM.
function blocks. Each template inherits from a super class
AbstractTemplate, and a higher level template can be
composed by several lower level ones.
3) Sentence patterns: Each type of requirements in templates
is organized as a list of sentences, which satisfy predefined
sentence patterns. Each sentence pattern inherits from a
super class Sentence, and their transformation rules are
defined in the gen() operation of Sentence.
2) Intermediate model (RAInterM): RAInterM is an inter-
mediate model, which is used to bridge the gap between the
RM-RNL and AADL models. As a result, the transformation is
divided into two steps: the transformation from the RM-RNL to
the intermediate model RAInterM and the transformation from
the intermediate model to the AADL models. The reasons of
introduction of the intermediate model RAInterM are given as
follows.
1) Simplifying the transformation: The elements of the
RM-RNL and the AADL models satisfy many-to-many
mappings. Some mappings are complex, for instance,
mappings of sentence patterns, which can be related
to multiple templates in the RM-RNL. An intermediate
model can separate many-to-many mappings into many-
to-one and one-to-many mappings, which can decrease
the complexity of the transformation.
2) Guaranteeing the compatibility of extension: We can sup-
press irrelevant features of AADL (e.g., declarations and
implementations) in the transformation from the RM-RNL
to RAInterM. Thus, when extending sentence patterns
in the RM-RNL, we only need to consider the transfor-
mation of the extended elements instead of the entire
transformation from the RM-RNL to AADL.
The metamodel of RAInterM is presented in Fig. 6. RAInterM
is a component-based model, and the top concept is Model,
which represents an entire abstract system. Component repre-
sents entities in Model, and type of Component is defined in
glossary. Statemachine can be classified as MTStateMachine and
BHVStateMachine. MTStateMachine refers to both mode tran-
sitions in RM-RNL and AADL, and BHVStateMachine refers
Algorithm 1: Transformation From the RM-RNL to the
RAInterM Model.
Require:
RM-RNL
Ensure:
RAInterM
1: for each Template t in RM-RNL.getTemplates do
2: Component c = new Component (t.getType);
3: for each Port p in t.getPorts do
4: p.gen(RAInterM, c, p.PortType);
5: end for
6: end for
7: for each Port p in RAInterM.getPorts do
8: if p.NoSameNamePort then
9: p.type = DATAACCESS;
10: RAInterM.add(data = newComponent(DATA));
11: RAInterM.addDataAccessConnections(p, data);
12: else
13: RAInterM.addConnections(p,
p.getSameNamePort);
14: end if
15: end for
16: for each Sentence s in t.getRequirements do
17: s.transform(RAInterM, c);
18: //Each type of requirements transformed into
different parts in RAInterM
19: end for
to both Functional Requirement in RM-RNL and BA in AADL.
Connection and Port refer to the concepts of port and connection
in AADL, representing the interactions among components.
3) Transformation from the RM-RNL to the RAInterM
Model: To facilitate the transformation from the RM-RNL
to RAInterM, we develop a transformation algorithm (see
Algorithm 1). This algorithm can be divided into three parts.
1) Transformation of the structure of RM-RNL: The structure
of RM-RNL is transformed first, including the hierar-
chical relationship among templates and Input/Output.
SRT, SSRT, FRT, SFRT, and SFBRT are transformed into
Components with corresponding types. Input/Output are
transformed into Port in RAInterM.
2) Generation of connection: Requirement specifications in
the RM-RNL may be incomplete. For each Port, we create
a series of Connections to link it with other ports, which
have the same port type and opposite direction. If no
matchable port exists, we create a data component in top
Component connecting with single ports.
3) Transformation of the elements in templates: The Trans-
formation of sentence pattern is realized in “gen()” op-
eration. Thus, Functional Requirements, Performance
Requirements, Mode Transitions, Interface Requirements,
and Hardware Constraints are mainly transformed into
BHVStateMachine, Property, MTStateMachine, Prop-
erty of Port, and Components with hardware types in
RAInterM, respectively.
Fig. 7. Requirement traceability information model.
Algorithm 2: Transformation From the RAInterM Model to
the AADL Models.
Require:
RAInterM
Ensure:
AADL models
1: for each Component c in RAInterM.getComponents do
2: if c.isSystem then
3: AADL.add(new System n);
4: else if c.isProcess then
5: AADL.add(new Process n);
6: else if c.isThread then
7: AADL.add(new Thread n);
8: else if c.isSubprogram then
9: AADL.add(new Subprogram n);
10: else
11: AADL.add(new Abstract n);
12: end if
13: AADL.addInstance(n.newInstance);
14: c.getPorts → n.features;
15: c.SubComponents → n.instance.subcomponents;
16: c.Connections → n.instance.connections;
17: c.MTStateMachine.getStates → n.instance.modes;
18: c.MTStateMachine.getTransitions
→ n.instance.transitions;
19: c.Properties → n.instance.properties;
20: c.BHVStateMachine → n.instance.BA;
21: end for
4) Transformation from the RAInterM model to the AADL
models: Since we implement the metamodel of RAInterM and
the metamodel of AADL in the source code of OSATE, we
develop another algorithm (see Algorithm 2) to facilitate the
transformation from RAInterM to AADL.
The transformation from RAInterM to AADL can be divided
as the generation of AADL-type declarations and of AADL im-
plementation declarations; the first one includes AADL features
such as ports, and the second one includes other information of
AADL models, such as subcomponents, connections, properties,
mode transitions, annexes, etc. AADL components are generated
based on Component in RAInterM, and ports, connections, MT-
StateMachine, BHVStateMachine, and properties in RAInterM
are transformed into features, connections, mode transitions, BA,
and properties of AADL components, respectively.
C. Traceability
In this section, we propose a requirement traceability informa-
tion model, which can standardize the process of establishing the
requirement traceability links, shown in Fig. 7. In the following
paragraphs, we elaborate on the key elements of the requirement
traceability model.
1) TraceabilityLink in Fig. 7 connects traceability artifact to
define their dependence relations. One end of a traceability
link is attached to a set of requirement elements, and the
other end of the traceability link is attached to a set of el-
ements of design model. In other words, traceability links
build the relations between the elements of requirement
and design model. Each traceability link has an attribute
“id,” which uniquely identifies the link. Traceability link
types define the type of a link and give the semantics of
the link. The sublink relation of traceability links indicates
that the traceability links are not independent of each
other. Some links are the sublinks of other links. In this
article, the traceability relationship refers to the set of all
traceability links.
2) TraceabilityElement refers to the elements that are sup-
posed to be linked in order to ensure traceability. So, there
are two kinds of traceability elements: the element of the
RM-RNL and the element of AADL models.
3) RTIM is the root element, which contains traceability
elements and all the generated traceability links.
4) TraceType enumeration is used to specify links types,
which are represented as follows.
a) Generation automatically relates the component to
a requirement through model transformation. In this
article, each traceability link type is generation by
default.
b) ImplementedBy relates requirement to system
fragments, implementation plans, code source, etc.
c) MappedTo relates requirement to a particular
attribute, operation, state, or value of the artifact.
d) Satisfy relates requirement to the component that
fulfills it.
e) Refine relates a requirement to its refined
requirement.
f) Verify relates requirements to test cases.
Model transformation is the process of converting a source
model into a target model based on a set of transformation rules.
The rules are defined with a model transformation language
[40]. These transformation rules manipulate elements defined
in metamodels. In our approach, the process of automatically
generates the requirement traceability links actually consist of
three steps.
1) Traceability links are established between the RM-RNL
and the RAInterM model generated from it, while Gener-
ate_RAInterM is performed.
2) Traceability links are established between a RAInterM
model and the AADL models generated from it, while
Generate_AADL is performed.
3) Traceability links are established between the RM-RNL
and the AADL models through merging the generated
traceability links in the former two step.
V. MAINTAIN REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY DURING THE
REFINEMENT OF AADL MODELS
The initial AADL models automatically generated by model
transformations cannot fully express all the properties of an em-
bedded software system, for instance, nonfunctional properties
such as schedulability, and the related feature of the execution
platform. Thus, the requirement traceability links may not be
complete. Therefore, we study how to realize the change of
requirements in the refinements of AADL models, and how to
maintain the requirement traceability links at the same time.
A. Global View the AADL-Based Development
Practically, the AADL models require iterative refinement
before the system synthesis. As shown in Fig. 8, we give a
global view of our AADL-based development approach. The
refinement can be done at different phases, for instance, software
requirement specifications, design, and coding. First, we rewrite
the requirements of embedded software through RM-RNL and
Fig. 8. Global view of the AADL-based development.
then automatically generate the initial AADL models by model
transformations, as well as the requirement traceability links.
It needs to maintain the consistency between requirements and
AADL models by regenerating the AADL models and the trace-
ability links when a requirement change is happened. Second,
the generated initial AADL models are incomplete. Thus, it
needs a refinement process, which may include several steps.
In our work, we refine the AADL models from two aspects.
One is to enrich the functional/nonfunctional expression of
AADL models. It mainly includes adding some description of
functional and nonfunctional requirements to the AADL models
that cannot be specified in the RM-RNL or are difficult automat-
ically transformed to the AADL models. The other is structure
reorganization of AADL models; it mainly considers the factors
of safety and reliability, or automatic code generation. Moreover,
the AADL models should be formally verified, in which we use
TASM and UPPAAL to verify the individual properties of each
component, use the compositional verification tool AGREE to
verify the system properties of the hierarchical components, and
use Cheddar [41] to verify the schedulability of the system. The
verification results will be further feedback to the AADL models
and, thus, to guide the modification of AADL models.
Finally, the executable C and Ada code can be generated.
Similarly, we also need to perform the code refinement to
make the code executable, by adding some platform-specific
information to C/Ada that cannot be automatically generated
from the AADL models, such as the watchdog in the VxWorks
operating system, etc.
In this article, the refinement of requirements (or requirement
change) focuses on the expression ability of the RM-RNL. We
maintain the consistency between requirements and the AADL
models, as well as the effectiveness of traceability links through
Fig. 9. Merge pattern for refinement of AADL models.
model transformations, which will not be discussed here. In this
section, we focus on the refinement of AADL models. However,
it is a very complex process of generated a complete AADL
models, which requires several iteration refinements.
Traceability can effectively support change impact analysis,
coverage analysis, test optimization, and so on. Therefore, it is
very important to establish and maintain the traceability links
(path) in the refinement of AADL models, especially in the
safety-critical domains.
B. Maintain Requirement Traceability Through AADL
Refinement Patterns
The refinement of AADL models is an iterative design
process. In this section, we describe the refinement patterns,
i.e., general refinement scenarios, and how to maintain the
requirement traceability in this refinement patterns.
First, we consider the merge pattern. This pattern is taking two
or more components aggregated into a single one that performs
the same function. The purpose of such refinement is to provide
a single functionally equivalent component, from which it will
be simpler to generate implementation code.
As shown in Fig. 9, before refinement, process P contains
two threads T1 and T2; thread T1 processes the data received
at its input port and sends the computation results to its output
port. The data are then received at the input port of thread T2
through the port connection between the threads. Thread T2
then processes the data and sends the result to its output port.
In addition, T1 and T2 have a traceability relationship with
the subfunction requirement template SFRT1 and SFRT2 in the
RM-RNL, respectively.
After refinement, the two threads are aggregated into a single
one that performs the same function, and the traceability links
between thread T1 (or T2) and SFRT1 (or SFRT2) are broken
since thread T1 (or T2) does not exist anymore in the new
AADL models. Then, we must refine the original requirements
in the RM-RNL and fix the traceability links between the refined
requirements and the AADL models.
Furthermore, considering the factors of reliability and safety,
it is necessary to optimize the AADL models, such as increasing
the redundancy of the components that realize the safety-critical
functions, or increasing the shared data access mechanism to
improve the reliability of data interaction, and so on. Thus,
Fig. 10. Spilt pattern for refinement of AADL models.
we introduce the split pattern. As shown in Fig. 10, we use
a shared data access mechanism to refine the initial AADL
model. Before refinement, the process P contains two threads
T1 and T2; thread T1 processes the data received at its input
port and sends the computation results to its output port. The
data are then received at the input port of thread T2 through
the port connection between the threads. Thread T2 then further
processes the data and sends the result to its output port. After
refinement, the port connection between two threads is replaced
by a data subcomponent (buffer), which is shared by the sender
and receiver threads via two data access connections. There-
fore, the original port connection is split into three elements.
Additionally, subprogram calls are also added to each thread to
implement the refined communication mechanism (not shown
in the figure).
Similarly, the original traceability links between the require-
ments and the initial thread are broken since a new data subcom-
ponent is added to the process. In order to fix the traceability links
and requirements, we need to add a new data item to the data
dictionary in the RM-RNL to describe the information of buffer
data components; we also need to modify the data interaction
between SFRT1 and SFRT2 and the corresponding requirement
constraints in the requirement template.
Before code generation, it is necessary to further refine the
AADL models based on the features of target code and the
execution platform. Therefore, we review additions to attach
some platform-specific details or code representing an interrupt
service routine. For instance, we can further to refine the AADL
models by adding a property association to data, such as we
can use the Allowed-Memory-Binding and Allowed-Memory-
Binding Class properties to indicate the memory (or device)
hardware the port resources reside on.
Finally, the target code (such as C or Ada) can be generated
based on the refined AADL models.
VI. CASE STUDIES
We illustrate our approach through two industrial case stud-
ies: Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) [42], [43] and
Rocket Launch Control System (RLCS), including the specifi-
cation of the requirements with RM-RNL and the generation of
the traceability links through the MACAerospace toolset.
A. AOCS
AOCS is a subsystem in the GNCC system on board a satellite.
Its task is to ensure that the satellite attitude and orbit remain sta-
ble and follow prespecified profiles by ground control. In the case
Fig. 11. Conceptual structure of AOCS.
of geostationary telecommunication satellites, for instance, the
AOCS is responsible for ensuring that each particular satellite
retains its position over the Earth’s equator at a given longitude
and keeps its antennas pointed toward the ground station.
The conceptual structure of the AOCS is shown in Fig. 11.
The AOCS is a typical embedded hard real-time control system.
It periodically collects the measurements from a set of sensors
and converts them into commands for a set of actuators. The
AOCS interacts with a ground control station, from which it
receives commands (telecommands), and to which it forwards
housekeeping data (telemetry).
Our requirement document of AOCS has 200 pages, and it is
obtained from the industrial partner. It has nine sections (such
as Attitude Determination, Orbit calculation, Attitude Control,
Orbit Control, etc.) and 124 modules. We manually extract the
structure of the AOCS requirements and specify them using the
RM-RNL modeling function with MACAerospace. For confi-
dentiality reasons, we are only allowed to present a sanitized
portion of the AOCS case study in this article.
First, we construct a data dictionary and a glossary of AOCS
based on the original textual documents. Then, we use the RM-
RNL to specify the AOCS requirements. The decomposition
structure of a system should be accomplished by requirement
engineers, who have a wide knowledge on the object system.
In this case study, the structure of decomposed systems is given
in the requirement documents. The corresponding hierarchical
structure described in the RM-RNL plug-in of MACAerospace
is shown in Fig. 12. After the requirement specification with the
RM-RNL, we can automatically generate initial AADL models
and the traceability links between RM-RNL and AADL models.
The RM-RNL of AOCS includes 12 system/subsystem re-
quirement templates, ten function requirement templates, and
one subfunction template, and so on. The statistical data are
shown in Table IV, and the statistical data of generated AADL
models and traceability links are shown in Table V.
All types of templates except Shared Function Block and
all sentence patterns except Interface-Sentence are covered by
this case study. There are 19 types of sentence patterns in
the RM-RNL, which include three types of Interface-Sentence.
Thus, the coverage of RM-RNL template elements and sentence
patterns are 80.0% and 84.2%, and we believe this case study
can cover enough elements for evaluation. The hierarchical
templates refer to system, process, thread components in AADL;
Fig. 12. Structure of AOCS requirements in the MACAerospace toolset.
TABLE IV
STATISTICAL DATA OF RM-RNL FOR AOCS CASE STUDY
TABLE V
STATISTICAL DATA OF GENERATED AADL MODELS AND TRACEABILITY LINKS
FOR AOCS CASE STUDY
In/Out refers to port and condition in AADL; Mode Transition
refers to mode transition in AADL; and Functional Requirement
refers to BA in AADL. As we explained in Section III-A, each
sentence pattern has its own transformation rules; some of them
can be transformed into two or more transitions in BA, such
as sentence pattern “< Condition > + < Behavior > +
< else > + < Behavior >” is transformed into two transi-
tions representing “if” and “else,” respectively.
A part of requirement traceability links is shown in Fig. 13,
and the traceability table presents a set of one-to-many mappings
from the elements in the RM-RNL to the elements in the AADL
Fig. 13. Part of generated requirement traceability links of the attitude control
subsystem.
Fig. 14. Traceability link of the attitude control subsystem.
models. To take the mode and mode transition of attitude control
subsystem as an example, the upper part of Fig. 14 is the RM-
RNL, and the lower part is the corresponding AADL code. The
dashed lines in this figure that describe the traceability links
between the elements of the RM-RNL and the AADL code.
B. RLCS
The RLCS is a critical subsystem of the rocket launcher
system (RLS). The function of the RLS is to control the rocket
to perform various operations and automatically execute the
function of rocket launch during the period from receiving
the launch command to the rocket leaving the launcher. RLCS
running on the launch control unit (LCU) computer, and the
LCU computer interacts with other modules of the RLS through
the bus and/or network. The RLCS can ensure the normal
TABLE VI
STATISTICAL DATA OF THE RM-RNL FOR RLCS CASE STUDY
TABLE VII
STATISTICAL DATA OF THE GENERATED AADL MODELS AND TRACEABILITY
LINKS FOR RLCS CASE STUDY
execution of the launch function of the rocket through a serious
of hardware–software interaction.
The requirement document of RLCS has more than 300 pages.
In this article, we only show the requirements of the launch
and control subsystem, which has 56 pages. For confidentiality
reasons, we consider 24 subfunction modules in the main control
layer and process layer of the RLCS in this article.
Similarly, we first construct the data dictionary and the glos-
sary of RLCS and then specify the RLCS requirements through
the requirement modeling function of MACAerospace. After
the requirement specification with the RM-RNL, the initial
AADL models and the requirement traceability links can be
generated automatically by the model transformation function
of MACAerospace.
The requirements of the RLCS are specified in the RM-
RNL, including 13 system/subsystem requirement templates,
14 functional requirement templates, and 76 shared function
requirement templates, and so on. The statistical data are shown
in Table VI; the statistical data of generated AADL models and
traceability links are shown in Table VII.
The traceability links are presented in tabular form in the
MACAerospace, and the elements of the RM-RNL and the
AADL models are one-to-many mapping, that is, one element
in the RM-RNL can be traced to many elements in the AADL
models.
Since these traceability links are automatically generated
along with the model transformation in our approach, all the
generated traceability links should be correct if the transforma-
tion rules and algorithms are correct. However,we still manually
check these traceability links with industry partners to ensure the
effectiveness of traceability links. We ensure that at least one
traceability link exists for each element in the RM-RNL and the
AADL models.
Then, we improve the initial AADL models through model
refinement, which mainly include improving the expression
of functional and nonfunctional requirements, reorganizing the
structure of the AADL models based on refinement patterns,
and adding the information of platform-specific, and so on. At 
this time, the original requirement traceability links and the 
consistency between the requirements and the AADL models 
will be broken. Therefore, we must maintain the consistency 
between the requirements and the AADL models, that is, we 
need to change the requirements and traceability links during 
the refinement of the AADL models.
The refined AADL models are verified by the verifica-
tion tools, such as TASM and UPPAAL. If the verification 
fails, the AADL models will be further modified according to 
the counterexample, and if so, we can automatically generate 
the architecture C/Ada codes with the support of the devel-
oped code generation tool. Before that, we should perform 
the second-round refinement, which is required to derive the 
platform-specific model. MACAerospace provides an user in-
terface for the PSM refinement to assist users adding informa-
tion that is OS-related, hardware-related, programming-related, 
communication-related, etc. For example, we need to add the 
platform features of the VxWorks operating system in the AOCS 
case, such as watchdog, etc., because the AOCS is developed on 
the VxWorks operating system. However, we have not consider 
the characteristics of the operating system in the refinement of 
the RLCS case study, because it is developed in the Ada language 
and runs without an operating system.
Requirement traceability can effectively support the analysis 
and verification of software artifacts and can effectively re-
duce the maintenance cost of software artifacts. In traditional 
software development, traceability links between requirements 
and design models need to be established manually, is often 
time-consuming and error-prone. To improve this situation, we 
provide an automatic method to generate the traceability links 
between requirements and the design models.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we will evaluate our approach and summarize 
the threats to its validity. Finally, we also discuss the lessons 
learned and limitations of our approach.
A. Evaluation Experiments
We mainly evaluate the approach from two aspects: the practi-
cability of RM-RNL and the quality of requirement traceability
links.
We conducted a deep investigation when designing the
RM-RNL, including fully understanding the requirements de-
scription in the actual projects through close interaction with
engineers, and verified the RM-RNL using actual industrial
cases. The RM-RNL has been modified and adjusted several
times. Therefore, we consider that the RM-RNL can meet the
basic requests of industrial requirement description. In addition,
the RM-RNL has good scalability. We evaluate the practicability
of the RM-RNL in this article via a questionnaire. This ques-
tionnaire includes four measures: understandability, usability,
effectiveness, and restrictiveness. Four statements are designed
for these four measures and are presented in Table VIII. We
requested the subjects to rate each question relevance on a scale
between 0 (completely disagree) and 9 (completely agree).
TABLE VIII
EVALUATION THE PRACTICABILITY OF THE RM-RNL
The requirement traceability links are generated by using
model transformation in this article, and therefore, these links
should be correct in the premise of the transformation rules,
and algorithms are correct. Based on this theory, we design
the following experiments to illustrate the advantages of our
approach.
We set up two groups of comparison experiments. One group
manually establishes the traceability links between the RM-RNL
and the AADL models, and the other group manually estab-
lishes the traceability links between the original requirement
documents and the AADL models. Then, we compare the
traceability links established by manually with those generated
automatically using the MACAerospace toolset.
In addition, we observe the impact of engineering expe-
rience in the experimental results by comparing the trace-
ability links established by engineers and students (master’s
students and fourth-year undergraduate students) in each set
of experiments. The experimental results are measured using
two metrics, namely, accuracy and recall. In this article, we
use linksMACAerospace to represent the traceability links generated
by the MACAerospace toolset and linksmanually to represent
the traceability links established by subjects. Then, we define
matched links as the links, which appear in both linksMACAerospace
and linksmanually. Therefore, the definitions of the accuracy and
recall are as follows.
Accuracy is the ratio between the number of matched links
and the number of links that are established by subjects
accuracy =
|{linksMACAerospace} ∩ {linksmanually}|
|{linksmanually}|
. (1)
Recall is the ratio between the number of matched links and
the number of links that are automatically generated by the
MACAerospace toolset
recall =
|{linksMACAerospace} ∩ {linksmanually}|
|{linksMACAerospace}|
. (2)
B. Evaluation Results
The subjects consist of 12 students (seven fourth-year under-
graduate students and five master’s students) and six engineers
from industry. A lecture is given to the subjects regarding the
RM-RNL and the MACAerospace toolset before conducting the
experiment. The evaluation results of the RM-RNL obtained by
the questionnaire are as shown in Fig. 15.
Fig. 15 compares the evaluation scores given by the 18
subjects for the practicability for the RM-RNL. All measures
of RM-RNL are rated highly with a median of either 7 or 8
Fig. 15. Evaluation results of practicability for the RM-RNL.
TABLE IX
EVALUATION RESULTS OF THE QUALITY OF REQUIREMENT
TRACEABILITY LINKS
except for restrictiveness (avg: 2.61, med: 3, and std: 1.04).
Individual statistics are given follows: understandability (avg:
7.34, med: 7.5, and std: 0.85), usability (avg: 7.28, med: 7, and
std: 0.89), and effectiveness (avg: 7.50, med: 4, and std: 0.79).
All subjects found RM-RNL to be practicable. We believe that
the MACAerospace toolset has improved the understanding and
cognition for RM-RNL.
In the evaluation experiment of the quality of traceability
links, we divided the 18 subjects into two groups, with each
group consisting of six students and three engineers. The sub-
jects established the traceability links between the original re-
quirement documents and the AADL models in Group A, and the
subjects established the traceability links between the RM-RNL
and the AADL models in Group B. The evaluation results are
shown in Table IX.
Comparing the two sets of experiments results, we find the
following:
1) The accuracy and recall of Group B are significantly higher
than those of Group A.
2) In the same case study, the accuracy and recall of engineers
are significantly higher than those of students in Group A,
but this advantage is not obvious in Group B.
3) In both groups, the accuracy and recall of the RLCS cases
study are lower than in the AOCS case study.
Therefore, we draw the following conclusions.
1) The RM-RNL can effectively improve the understanding
of the requirements for subjects and also indirectly prove
the effectiveness of the RM-RNL.
2) Our approach can generate more complete requirement
traceability links than the manual method, that is, our
approach is effective.
3) With the increasing complexity of the software system, it
is not reliable to manually establish the traceability links
between requirements and the design models.
In addition, requirement traceability links are automatically
generated along with model transformations to generate the
design models in our approach, and thus, there is no additional
time or costs associated with establishing the traceability links
between requirements and the design models.
C. Threats to Validity
Besides inheriting all limitations of the underlying software
quality engineering and model-driven traceability techniques,
our approach exhibits some threats to validity. In order to reduce
the possible threat to validity, we communicate with industry
partners iteratively to obtain more information and try to make
each case study more real. However, we still find some threats
to validity of our approach.
1) Correctness: The input of the RM-RNL is given by the en-
gineers that define the system decomposition and other elements
based on their understanding. This means that not every input
combination is valid, and it becomes increasingly unlikely that
the input remains consistent, especially if the input is provided
by different engineers. It is important for future work to provide
correctness checks based on the consistency of the input, despite
the fact that consistency does not imply correctness. The result
of the evaluation experiment shows that there is no obvious
difference among RM-RNLs created by different subjects if the
original requirement document is more standardized.
2) Granularity: It is difficult to establish at what level of
granularity traces between requirements and design models
should be generated. The trace links between requirements and
design models can be created in different level of granularity,
e.g., the requirement traceability links can be created at the
system level or at the (sub)function level, or even on a require-
ment sentence, and so on. Then, the engineer has the choice
to establish traceability between the model elements, and it is
unrealistic to keep under control all requirements and design
models at all levels of abstraction.
3) Requirement Specification Based on the RM-RNL: The
AOCS and RLCS case studies may not cover all possible situa-
tions for safety-critical systems. We see opportunities and needs
to apply MACAerospace in other systems of different domains
such as the vehicle control system in the automotive domain.
Further investigation of the applicability of MACAerospace
through larger scale case studies will be conducted in the near
future in a real industrial setting.
D. Discussions
From the experiment results reported, we observe that the
RM-RNL is overall easy to understand and apply. At the same
time, the applicability of the RM-RNL can be further improved
since the MACAerospace toolset can be used to enforce the
proper usage of keywords specified in the restrictions on the use
of control structures.
It is worth noting that inconsistent requirement specification
in the RM-RNL may lead to low-quality AADL models and
traceability information. However, we believe that inconsisten-
cies among requirement specifications can be reduced if the
RM-RNL restrictions are properly applied. In summary, the
RM-RNL can be better applied in practice due to support from 
the MACAerospace toolset.
During the collaboration with our industrial partner for de-
vising the methodology, developing the tool, and conducting 
the industrial case studies, we learned the following lessons and 
identified some challenges when applying our approach in real 
industrial contexts.
1) In the safety-critical domain, a number of standards (e.g.,
DO-178B/C and ISO26262 [44]) are recommended to
be followed when developing requirement specifications.
However, even though guided by such standards, we
observed that there are hidden guidelines (i.e., implicit
domain knowledge) followed by domain experts and re-
quirements engineers but not documented anywhere. Such
hidden rules were hard to obtain, and we spent a lot
of effort eliciting such information. We believe there
are still more of these rules to discover. Understanding,
formalizing, and enabling automated analyses of such
requirements require domain knowledge. Furthermore,
these aforementioned hidden rules need to be identified
and embedded as part of the methodology and tool. We
believe that our approach can be easily tailored for accom-
modating such domain-specific rules. During the domain
analysis, a lot of effort was spent on identifying and
clarifying such rules with our industrial partner, and the
whole process was highly iterative.
2) We observed that some of the requirements need to de-
scribe data flows. Doing so with restricted natural lan-
guages is not as straightforward as describing control
flows. Therefore, our approach is mainly designed for
describing control flows, which is similar to AADL.
Although our approach supports basic descriptions of
data processes, such as data transitions and assignments,
it requires more effort compared with the capability of
any programming language. Thus, in the future, we will
consider how to describe the data flows in a better way.
3) Sentence patterns in RM-RNL (see Section IV) are ade-
quate for describing the requirements of the case studies.
However, the case studies are only for an aerospace control
system and RLS. If one wants to apply the RM-RNL to
other domains, it may not be enough for the requirements
be expressed by the predefined sentence patterns. To ac-
commodate this challenge, we implemented our toolset
as an extensible framework, which will make it easier to
introduce new sentence patterns as well as to generate trace
links in the future.
4) Traceability is rarely directly supported by current soft-
ware development processes [45]. There is a lack of guid-
ance, both with respect to traceability planning and the
evaluation of cost and benefit and with respect to when and
how to actually carry out traceability-related tasks during
software development. Although our approach supports
extending model-driven design ideas to the requirement
phase, the traceability between requirements and design
can be generated automatically when deriving the de-
sign model through model transformation. But in MDD,
traceability should be regarded not only as an output of
model transformation, but also considered in the context of
the larger development process. This calls for addressing
pre and postmodeling traceability and for traceability of
transformation specifications.
5) The autogenerated requirement trace links of our approach
are only a coarse-grained traceability relationship. The
more complete and accurate requirement traceability rela-
tionship needs to be artificially perfected in the refinement
of the AADL model or through formal derivation and other
methods. In addition, this automatic approach to trace
recording only supports one general type of trace link.
Furthermore, there is disagreements with the requirement
traceability community, which has an understanding of
semantics as the meaning of a link, and the modeling
community in semantics is comprehended more in the
concrete technical context of conditions, events, and ac-
tions. Merging both views could be beneficial for both
communities. There is also a tradeoff between applying re-
source extensive, but semantically more accurate, manual
techniques, and cost-efficient, but inaccurate, automatic
approaches.
VIII. RELATED WORK
We carefully searched for previous work with relation to the
study reported in this article and classify the discussion into three
topics: requirement specifications in restricted natural language,
automated traceability, and model refinement.
A. Requirement Specifications in Restricted Natural Language
Requirements should be easy to understand, since they are
usually written as a means for communication between different
stakeholders (e.g., users and developers). There are many differ-
ent ways to document requirements. One common way is to use
textual descriptions only. Other ways to document requirements
include use cases and customized document templates. For some
systems (e.g., safety-critical systems), requirements may even
be documented as formal specifications.
In most cases, requirements are represented as natural lan-
guage, which is easy to understand. However, there are some
shortcomings, such as ambiguity and difficult to be processed
automatically. In order to solve these problems, restricted natural
language came into being. A restricted natural language is
also called a controlled natural language (CNL). It is a subset
of natural language obtained by restricting the grammar and
vocabulary. It aims to reduce ambiguity, redundancy, size, and
complexity of requirements, and to facilitate automated analysis.
Mavin et al. proposed an Easy Approach to Requirement Syn-
tax (EARS) [46], [47]. The EARS provides specific keywords
to support the specification of four different types of normal
operation and one unwanted behavior. It is simple to use and
leads to clear and expressive descriptions of the desired func-
tionality. The EARS has been successfully applied to a variety
of complex safety-critical systems, e.g., aero-engine control
systems. Holtmann et al. proposed a CNL, which describes the
requirements of embedded software in automobile areas. CNL
can reduce the ambiguity of natural language; it can also detect
inconsistency and incompleteness of requirements, as well as
support the automate verification of requirements [48], [49].
CNL is mainly used to describe system requirements of auto-
motive systems. The EARS and CNL were developed primarily
for stakeholder requirements, as opposed to technical system
requirements.
Use case is another common description for requirements in
requirements engineering, and its expressions mainly include
use case diagram and use case textual specification. The use case
diagram has the exact definition and corresponding modeling
standard in UML; the use case textual specification is often
described in the form of a template for the use of natural
language. The use case textual specification generally includes
options such as use case names, descriptions, basic flows, and
optional flows. Yue et al. developed a modified use case model-
ing method, namely restricted use case modeling (RUCM) [50]–
[52], which contains a relatively perfect with using case textual
specification template and a series of natural language used to
constraint template writing limit rules (restricted rules). This
made the use case description more easy to understand, reduced
the ambiguity, and allowed for the automatic generation of the
analysis model. In addition, the authors propose a method and a
tool called aToucan, to automatically generate a UML analysis
model comprising class, sequence, and activity diagrams from a
use case model and to automatically establish traceability links
between model elements of the use case model and the generated
analysis model.
RUCM is a general description method of requirements. It has
some shortcomings in the description of safety requirements in
SCS, but the RUCM method has good scalability. Therefore, Wu
et al. proposed a safety RUCM by extending some templates and
restricted rules into the existing RUCM. The safety RUCM sup-
ports the standardized description of safety requirements [53].
However, it still describes the requirements through use cases,
and the description of the domain features of the embedded
system is not comprehensive.
Gu et al. [54], [55] proposed a formal modeling approach
SPARDL as a concise way to specify embedded systems. It
can improve the quality of embedded systems in aerospace.
SPARDL is a formal requirements modeling method that can
accurately describe software requirements, but it is difficult for
engineers to use it directly.
AADL provides ReqSpec [56], a textual requirement specifi-
cation language Annex of AADL. ReqSpec supports the refine-
ment of requirements along with system designs, qualitative and
quantitative analysis of the created requirement specifications,
and verification of the associated system architecture models,
and thus ensures that requirements are met. ReqSpec mainly
focuses on the consistency between requirements and AADL
models, which is recommended for requirement specifications
along with the establishment of AADL models, instead of the
transformation of AADL models from requirements.
To summarize, the existing modeling methods for restricted
RNLs have their own advantages and disadvantages. For in-
stance, the EARS and RUCM are directly used for writing the
text requirement and were developed primarily for stakeholder
requirements. AADL ReqSpec is primarily used to express
traceability between the requirement document and the AADL
model. The RM-RNL can be better for specifying the input–
process–output features of embedded software. The RM-RNL is
a requirement modeling method for SCS and AADL. It combines
the advantages of RMCM, EARS, and other methods, which can
eliminate the ambiguity of NLRs and barely change engineer’s
habits of requirement specification. The RM-RNL can also
promote the application of MDD in the stage of NLRs.
B. Automated Traceability
Traceability has been defined as the ability to describe and
follow the life cycle of software artifacts [30]. van Lamsweerde
[57] reported several applications of formal specifications rel-
evant to traceability: refinement of specifications, derivation of
test cases, and extraction of specifications from source code are
transforming activities, which can produce trace links as by-
products. Of course, deriving a trace link as part of a generative
or transforming activity is rather intuitive: there is usually a link
derived-from from the product to the source artifact.
In the context of MDD, traces partially fulfill the same purpose
as in requirements engineering because in many tasks, MDD
is simply an automation of software engineering. The special
characteristic of MDD is the usage of models and automated
transformations. Therefore, the artifacts under study are mainly
(intermediate) models. This context influences the definitions
and semantics of the terms known from requirement traceability
and software engineering in general.
Gervasi and Zowghi [58] explored the automatic transfor-
mation from NLRs into formal logic. In their approach, they
analyzed NLRs with a part of speech tagger and then produced
equivalent formulas in predicate logic. The source and target
artifacts were stored in a database in order to make the transfor-
mation traceable. A similar transformation from requirements
to UML models was described by Ilieva and Ormandjieva [59],
[60]. While their model generation method could easily support
traceability, they did not mention it explicitly.
In addition, results from existing empirical studies [61]–[63]
demonstrate that traceability information has beneficial effects
on the effectiveness and efficiency of understanding changes,
performing requirements inspections, and evolving software
artifacts. Ghabi and Egyed introduced a language for expressing
uncertainties in traceability relationships between models and
code, which is the main benefit of this technique compared with
other traceability approaches [64], [65]. They also considered
artifacts with different natures that are architectural elements,
and extra-functional results utilized a similar approach [66],
[67].
Holtmann et al. proposed a semiautomatic method for es-
tablishing and maintaining requirement traceability in the pro-
cess of automated development based on the CNL requirement
specification method [50], [68], [69]. Meanwhile, Yue et al.
realized an RUCM tools—aToucan [52]; it can automatically
generate a UML analysis model and automatically establish
trace links between model elements of the use case model and
the generated analysis model. The aToucan is rule based and,
thanks to a modular design, facilitates modifications to the set
of transformation rules to accommodate different contexts (e.g.,
use different parsers).
C. Model Refinement
There are several works studying the specific nature of the
relationship between requirements and architectures and the
more general problem of model corefinement. In [70], Tang
et al. proposed an interesting traceability metamodel taking into
account the characterization of requirements and architecture
elements in terms of problem and solution spaces and capturing
design outcomes and decisions. An ontology supporting the
designer in corefinement is provided. However, only traceability
is managed automatically, and requirements and architecture
must be corefinement manually. In [71], Rahimi and Cleland-
Huang proposed a pattern of corefinement between requirements
and source code. Such patterns provide building blocks for
automating traceability maintenance, but, again, corefinement
of requirements and architecture is not addressed. In [72], a co-
evolution of use cases models and feature model configurations
is proposed and implemented with a bidirectional transforma-
tion language. In [73], Blouin et al. present a semiautomated
approach to evolve nonfunctional requirements and their trace
links following system’s architecture refinement in the context
of design space exploration and automated code generation. The
approach has been prototyped for AADL models refined with the
RAMSES tool and model transformations implemented as story
diagrams. In [74], Rahmoun et al. proposed an approach that
automates the identification of model transformation alternatives
(MTAs) taking into account their dependencies, and selections
of MTAs based on evolutionary algorithms that produce the best
output models with respect to nonfunctional properties.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this article, requirement traceability was broadly recog-
nized as a critical element of any rigorous software develop-
ment process, especially for building high-assurance and SCS
systems. MDD provided new opportunities for establishing
traceability links through model transformations. However, re-
quirement modeling was not involved in the MDD life cycle. To
promote the gap between NLRs and the AADL models, we pro-
posed a new requirement modeling method, which was named as
RM-RNL. The RM-RNL can promote the application of MDD
in safety-critical domains. In the context of MDD, we proposed a
method to automatically establish traceability links between the
elements of the RM-RNL and the generated AADL models. In
addition, we needed to maintain the traceability links when the
requirement change and/or AADL models refined. Therefore,
we proposed “refinement patterns” to achieve the change of
requirements and traceability links. Finally, we demonstrated
the effectiveness of our approach with industrial case studies
and evaluation experiments and discussed potential threats to its
validity.
In the future work, we will further improve the description
capability of the RM-RNL and automatically generate more
fine-grained requirement traceability links. At the same time,
we will realize the automatic maintenance of the requirement
traceability during the refinement (and evolution) of the AADL
models. In addition, we will consider automatically creating
Glossary and Data Dictionary through artificial intelligence
technologies.
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